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Inseparable Evils 1 
Inseparable Evils: The Chimera of Col-
ony and Genocide in German Southwest 
Africa 
Justin M. Hannigan 
Between 1904 and 1908, an estimated eighty-
percent of the Herero and half ofthe Nama indigenous 
popUlations living in the colony of German Southwest 
Africa (today the independent state of Namibia) were 
systematically killed by direct military violence, strate-
gic denial of food and water, or maltreatment through 
forced labor or in concentration camps. 1 The scale of 
human loss is staggering. In few other modern Euro-
pean colonial contexts were indigenous popUlations so 
completely and swiftly destroyed. The atrocities, which 
deserve a label no less than genocide, have had lasting 
effect on the people of Namibia and the memory of 
. colonialism and genocide. 
The treatment of the Herero and Nama genocides 
within comparative genocide scholarship has, however, 
distorted the historical event and been lacking in 
useful conclusions. There has been a fIxation upon the 
record of violence, at the expense of useful compara-
tive historical analysis. The genocides of 1904-1908 
must rather be situated as an inalienable component 
of the process of German settler colonialism in South-
west Africa. The genocide was not an aberration of 
colonialism in Southwest Africa; rather, it was an 
I Horst Dreschler. Let us Die Fighting: The Stroggle afthe 
Herem and Nama Against Gennan Imperialism (1884-1915), 
(London: Zed Press, 1980),214. 
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extension of the logic of settler colonialism and a 
central component in the establishment of real Ger-
man authority in the colony. The evils. of colonialism-
racism, the process of"othering" colonized peoples, the 
denial of sovereign autonomy, and economic exploita-
tion, among others - and the evils of genocide are not 
usually equated. In German Southwest Africa, how-
ever, circumstance married these historical realities. 
_ The history of genocide in Southwest Africa is incom-
plete without imbricating it with the history of colo-
nialism. Genocide was an instrument employed by the 
Germans to resolve weaknesses of their colonial 
project. 
The historical record of SWA demonstrates the 
inseparability of the narratives of genocide and the 
course of German imperialism. This paper argues that 
the German colonial enterprise, in order to establish 
full control over the indigenous peoples and their 
lands in SWA, was hindered by economic troubles, a 
lack of functional political, legal, and military author-
ity, a dearth of metropolitan enthusiasm, and a severe 
demographic problem in the form of a shortage of 
German settlers. While real and historically demon-
strable, this weakness contributed to a paranoiac 
sense of vulnerability among the settler population. In 
turn, these settlers pressured the government in Berlin 
to swiftly and decisively respond to the indigenous 
threat. The consequences were genocidal. I argue that 
the genocide of the Herero and Nama effectively 
resolved the issues facing German imperialism in 
SWA, situating the tragedy as part of the broader logic 
of settler colonialism driving events in the colony. The 
unsteadiness of colonial authority on the eve of the 
genocide can be seen in a variety of dimensions. A lack 
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of metropolitan support and enthusiasm, economic 
issues, underdeveloped infrastructure, the relatively 
small number of German settlers and their scattered 
distribution throughout the colony, and incomplete 
military control and legal authority caused anxiety 
among colonists and bedeviled German efforts to 
cOl.trol SWA. Each of these dimensions of the colonial 
enterprise will be examined in turn, up to the eve of 
the genocide in 1903. 
The tepidity of metropolitan enthusiasm for the 
colony is evident from the earliest days of German 
incursion. Otto von Bismarck, the first Chancellor of 
the German Empire, was vocal in his opposition to 
Germany's acquisition of overseas colonies in the first 
decade and a half after the Imperial unification in 
1871. If colonies were to be founded, Bismarck felt 
that "the flag must follow trade.,,2 Adolf Luderitz, the 
first German trader to buy indigenous land in the 
territory in 1883, quickly appealed to Berlin for impe-
. rial protection of his purchases. Bismarck engaged in 
an incredibly cautious diplomatic exchange with the 
British authorities in the Cape Colony to determine the 
geopolitical consequences of raising the German flag 
and, after much hesitant deliberation, cabled the 
German consul in Cape Town on 24 April 1884 to 
"declare officially that [Luderitzj and his establish-
ments are under the protection of the Reich."3 The 
dispatch of Heinrich Goring and an attache of just two 
officials in 1885 constituted the entirety of the German 
administration in the colony until 1895; in the estima-
tion of historian Jurgen Zimmerer, "this was nothing 
2 Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 24. 
, Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros, 40. 
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more than a symbolic occupation of German South-
west Africa.'" 
Even as the territory claimed by Germany grew to 
its full extent by 1886, and considering the arrange-
ment Bismarck had offered, Berlin responded to 
indigenous uprisings - faced with circumstances 
similar to those that would precipitate the genocide -
with nearly complete disinterest in becoming militarily 
involved in the support of the SWA colony.' In re-
sponse to German encroachment in 1888, sitting 
Herero Chieftain Kamaherero warned Provincial 
Administrator Goring and his administration of two 
that "if they did not wish to see their heads lying at 
their feet they should be out of Okahanda and well on 
their way to Germany before sunset."6 Goring was 
forced into a hurried retreat to the protection of the 
British enclave at Walvis Bay in response to the threat 
and promptly telegraphed Berlin for military assis-
tance. The request was halfheartedly fulfilled in June 
1889 with the dispatch of a meager 21 soldiers under 
the command of Curt von Fran<;ois.7 To historians who 
wish to defend the claim that, as a general law of 
European settler colonialism, invariably "frontier clash 
were effectively resolved when metropolitan troops 
defended settler interests," the early history of German 
4 Jurgen Zimmerer, "The Model Colony? Racial segregation, 
forced labour and total control in German South-West Africa," in 
Genocide in German South-West A/rica, Jurgen Zimmerer and 
Joachim Zeller, eds., E.J. Neather trans. (Monmouth, Wales: 
Merlin Press, 2003), 25. 
5 Ibid. 
, Silvester and Gewald, Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue 
Bool~ 30. 
7 Ibid., 32. 
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conflict with the indigenous people of SW A should 
serve as a cautionary ta1e! After this episode, Bis-
marck reiterated his position before the Reichstag: "I 
repeat that I am opposed to colonies, that is, the kind 
of colonies where officia1s must be placed and garri-
sons established... [though] if the locomotive of the 
empire has struck out on a new track for itself, I will 
not be the one to place stones in its way."g 
Lukewarm metropolitan enthusiasm toward SWA 
persisted up until the eve of the genocide in 1903, 
a1though the Chancellorships of Leo von Caprivi (1890-
1894) and Bernhard von Bulow (1900-1909) gradua1ly 
featured greater support for Germany's overseas 
possessions.1O Increasing competition with other 
European imperia1 po;;vers led to somewhat greater 
attention to Germany's African colonies, creating a 
situation where "for reasons of nationa1 pride and 
propaganda, any defeat in Southwest Africa was 
unacceptable."" Institutionally, Chancellor von Caprivi 
. founded the Kolonialabteilung (Colonia1 Section) under 
the Imperia1 Foreign Office, charged with managing 
Germany's overseas colonia1 expansion and enticing 
Germans to settle in the colonies!2 By 1903, however, 
the six districts that comprised the administration of 
8 Cook, Colonial Encounters in the Age of High Imperialism, 
23. 
9 Bridgman, The Revolt a/the Hereros , 40. 
10 By 1903, these included German Southwest Africa, 
German East Africa (today Tanzania), Cameroon, Togo, and a 
scattering of is lands in the Pacific, including Samoa and New 
Guinea. 
II Zimmerer, "The Model Colony?," in Genocide in Gennan 
South-West Africa, 25. 
12 Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros, 54. 
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German SWA were manned by only about 700 soldiers 
and police. 13 Although metropolitan enthusiasm for the 
colonial endeavor in SW A did grow gradually between 
1884 and 1903, commitment was not decisively 
asserted until the dispatch of thousands of 
Schutztruppe in response to the Herero uprising. 
Retroactively considering the dearth of early metropoli-
tan support for the colonial enterprise in 1907, Royal 
Commissioner to Southwest Africa Paul Rohrbach 
wrote bluntly; "The mere idea of doing something 
substantial toward the opening up of a country like 
South-West Africa, with such ridiculously small 
working capital, is about as absurd as the idea of a 
man who would try to cut a tunnel through the Alps 
with a pickaxe."l4 
Investment capital was also in short supply in the 
colony prior to the genocide. Examining the German 
Southwest Africa Company, which assumed posses-
sion of Liideritz's land purchases in 1885, Dreschler 
notes "a glaring discrepancy between the fmancial 
capacity of its shareholders and the modest capital 
stock of the company;" that is, the small amount of 
money committed to the colonizing effort was dispro-
portionate to the extreme wealth of the German 
Southwest Africa Company's shareholders. IS In spite of 
Liideritz's hopeful assurances of SW A's mining poten-
tial, investors remained rightfully unconvinced. After 
its fIrst year of operation, the German Southwest 
Africa Company reported losses of 15 per cent on the 
" Hull, Absolute Destruction, 7. 
>4 Silvester and Gewald, Annotated reprint of the 1918 Blue 
Book,28. 
" Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 30. 
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initial investment. '6 Embarrassed, the shareholders of 
this enterprise publicly revised their justification for 
investing in SWA, claiming it had been "out of motives 
of pure patriotism in order that the country which 
might in the future prove valuable would not pass into 
the hands of a foreign Power."17 By 1903, several 
copper mining companies had managed to establish 
sustainable operations in the colony in spite of the 
early difficulties. However, business reportage in the 
Deutsches Kolonialblatt, a propagandistic newsletter 
distributed by the Colonial Section to pUblicize Ger-
man efforts in the overseas colonies and entice new 
settlement, indicates indirectly that colonial mining 
enterprises in SWA were still troubled by a lack of 
investment. In one article, dated 15 February 1903, a 
mining prospector named Christopher James gave 
sunny reports of vast untouched copper lodes in the 
Otavi district ofthe colony. Discussing the size onodes 
he did uncover, the Kolonialblatt reported that "Herr 
James writes with certainty that if bigger mine shafts 
. are dug, one should find even larger ore deposits."'B If 
such anecdotal arguments for the mineral potential of 
the SWA colony were still made in 1903, it is safe to 
assume that investment from German industry re-
mained unforthcoming, or was at best incommensu-
rate with colonial administrator's ambitious expecta-
tions. 
The same Kolonialblatt article touches on another 
economic issue troubling the German colonial project 
16 Bridgman, The RelJolt o/the Hereros, 53. 
17 Silvester and Gewald, Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue 
Book,28. 
18 <lOtavi-Minen und Eisen bahngesellschaft," Deutsches 
Kolonialblatt, 15 February, 1903. 
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in SWA prior to the genocide: the difficulty of recruit-
ing indigenous labor. According to the article, "Herr 
James writes of the Herero as a fine people with good 
spirit and strong physicality. They are willing, good 
hearted, happy workers, quick on the up-take and 
outstandingly quick learners in the use drills and 
hammers, if they are handled properly."l9 Variations in 
opinion among German settlers regarding the aptitude 
of the Herero as laborers are to be expected, but it 
would be in accordance with the generally positive 
tone of the Kolonialblatt to emphasize the benefits of 
life and the possibilities of business in SWA. Many 
other settler accounts express frustration with manag-
ing indigenous labor. In 1902, a missionary named 
Herr Brincker described his perception of the Herero 
residing near his church: "Shocking immorality, 
disputatiousness, and thievery rule, specifically, the 
inner life of the [Herero] congregations. Everything is 
communal, sex in the highest degree."20 In addition to 
the perceived foibles of the Herero work ethic, a great 
many laborers were able to simply leave employment 
if they wished, by escape if not by mutual contract!l 
Those German settlers who pursued farming and cattle 
herding and were thus not reliant on large indigenous 
workforces, however, were at the same time succeeding 
economically through an insidious combination of 
thrift and theft: among them, the 1,052 German 
farmers in the colony by 1902 owned 44,487 head of 
"Ibid. 
20 Karla Poewe, The Namibian Herero: A History of Their 
Psychosocial Disintegration and Survival (Lewiston, New York: 
Edwin Mellen, 1985), 4l. 
21 Gewald, Herero Heroes, 129. 
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cattle, almost exclusively appropriated from the 
Herero. 22 Though settlers capably subsisted on the 
land through farming and raising cattle, grander 
commercial prospects for the colony remained bleak 
because of difficult labor relations and the failing 
promise of lucrative mineral deposits. 
The precarious state of the German colony in SWA 
on the eve of the genocide was reflected in the deficien-
cies of transportation infrastructure on which Euro-
pean colonialism necessarily relied. Regular shipping 
routes between the German port of Hamburg and the 
colony were nonexistent in the early years of the 
colony, whereas other European colonial powers 
already had well-established modes of transporting 
goods and personnel to African colonies. A telling 
example of this is that when Captain von Fran\;ois 
departed for SWA with his 21 soldiers in June 1889, 
they were forced to pose as "adventurers" rather than 
soldiers in order to earn passage on a British ship 
. bound for Walvis Bay.23 Railways in the colony were 
also underdeveloped. The rinderpest epidemic that 
swept across Africa between 1889 and 1897, killing 
perhaps 90,000 cattle in SWA alone, forced a shift 
away from the reliance on the ox-wagon transport 
. network utilized earlier in the colony.24 Indeed, con-
struction of a railway linking Windhoek, the adminis-
trative capital of the colony and an interior settlement, 
to the coast via Swakopmund had only begun in 1897 
as a response to the massive loss of beasts of burden 
" Silvester and Gewald, Annotated reprint of the 1918 Blue 
Book,73. 
23 Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 42 . 
" Silvester and Gewald, Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue 
Book, 72 and 73 (footnote). 
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as a result of this epidemic.25 Even by 1904, vast 
portions of the territory still remained inaccessible by 
rail.26 And, when a small revolt by the Nama forced 
Governor Theodor Leutwein southward with the 
majority of the Schutztruppe at the beginning of 
January 1904 - an opportunity which the Herero 
seized to begin their uprising on 14 January - the 
absence of a major north-south rail line delayed the 
German military's return to the Windhoek area until 
11 February.27 
The political and legal relations between the Ger-
man administration and indigenous leadership were 
increasingly unsteady by 1904. In this instance, it was 
the over-extension of German power that threatened 
the colonial enterprise. Disorganization and lack of 
foresight led to the irresponsible exercise of colonial 
authority on the part of the Germans. The precise 
tenets of the protection agreements forged by Leutwein 
and his predecessors with the various tribes were 
largely ignored in all dealings between Europeans and 
Africans, and the colonial administration treated the 
agreements as a surrender oj authority in practically 
every legal and political situation.28 Crucially, however, 
German authority across vast tracts of the territory 
prior to the war of 1904-1907 was practically nonexis-
tent. Outside the boundaries of effective colonial 
c:mtrol, tribes such as the Ovambo were largely 
beyond the purported aegis of German law and order, 
free to conau::t the;r own political and legal business 
25 Gewald, Herem Heroes, 128. 
26 A map depicting just how little rail infrastructure existed 
in German SWA is available in Hull, Absolute Destruction, 9. 
27 Ibid., 7-11. 
28 Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 26. 
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pending the possibility of German expansion. However, 
in those regions of the colony where German policing 
and authority did reach - namely, Hereroland -legal 
ordinances enshrined the concept that "leniency 
toward natives is cruelty to whites."29 Capital punish-
ment was consistently and ruthlessly applied in cases 
of serious crimes committed by Africans against 
Germans, while white settlers received juridical license 
to perpetrate even the most heinous crimes against 
Africans. "Surely, this goes to prove," Governor 
Leu twein wrote, "that a higher value was placed on the 
life of a white man than on that of a native.,,30 By the 
turn of the century, Leutwein had evidently come to 
believe that the rapine behavior of the average German 
settler toward indigenous peoples was endangering the 
legitimacy of the German colonial endeavor. 
As interactions between "colonizer" and "colonized" 
became even more unjust, tensions between German 
settlers and particularly the Herero grew. Leutwein 
. became distressed that the settler population was 
fulfIlling its own prophetic fear of a large-scale indige-
nous uprising.31 By 1904, three fault lines undercut 
German efforts to establish a unified program of legal 
and political dominance over SW A and its indigenous 
people. First, the incredibly prejudiced exercise onegal 
and political power on the part of the German settlers 
against the Herero had not forced them into dejected 
submission to colonial authority, but was rather 
driving the Herero closer to militancy and open strug-
" Silvester and Gewald, Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue 
Book,93. 
" Ibid., 94. 
31 Gewald, Herero Heroes, 142. 
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gle against Germany. Second, the German settler 
population, motivated by a complex of paranoia about 
indigenous threats and an ideologically-absolute 
mentality of settler colonialism that demanded superi-
ority and security in every dimension of colonial life, 
was agitating for even more forceful treatment ofnative 
groups such as the Herero and, incidentally, greater 
metropolitan support of this position. Between these 
two mutually incompatible schemas stood the precious 
few reasonable individuals - some within the colonial 
administration; such as Governor Theodor Leutwein; 
some sitting in the Reichstag, such as socialist August 
Bebel;32 and some from the indigenous populations, 
most notably Hendrik Witbooi of the Nama - who 
were interested in a reasoned and non-violent renegoti-
ation of the terms which had to that point guided the 
course of German colonialism in Southwest Africa. 
Leutwein later made a crucial observation, which 
sheds much light on the commission of genocide on 
the part ofthe German military. German settlers, who 
did not understand the delicate balance of the fledgling 
colonialism in SWA, "Were inclined, with their inborn 
feeling of belonging to a superior race, to appear as 
members of a conquering army, even though we had 
conquered nothing."33 Indeed, the Germans, up to 
1903, actually had not conquered the lands that were 
being settled. In all the haphazard weaknesses and the 
32 Helmut Walser Smith, "The Talk of Genocide, the Rhetoric 
of Miscegenation: Notes on Debates in the Gennan Reichstag 
Concerning Southwest Africa, 1904-14," in The Imperialist 
Imagination: German Colonialism and Its Legacy, Sara 
Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox, and Susanne Zantop, eds. (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 107. 
33 Gewald, Herero Heroes, 145. 
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uneven excesses of brutal power exercised by the 
colonizing Germans, the fundamental recourse to arms 
had not been denied to the Herero, neither through 
disarmament nor through the development of a mili-
tary presence large enough to deter violent rebellion. 
On 14 January, Chieftain of the Herero Samuel 
Maherero issued orders that all German males in 
Hereroland were to be round up and killed.34 Reliable 
accounts show that in the first weeks of the war, 
somewhere around 150 settlers - and only a few of 
them women - were killed by the Herero, but the 
German press reported inflated accounts of the 
coldblooded killings of women and children, the Herero 
practice of mutilating the bodies of enemies killed in 
battle, and wanton rape and pillage.3s These reports 
shocked metropolitan Germans. Reinforcements were 
ordered immediately and arrived from Germany under 
the ruthless command of Lieutenant General Lothar 
von Trotha. He possessed a conviction that "all colo-
.nies had to be conquered with blood" and wrote in his 
diary on 1 July 1904 that "the natives must give way ... 
either via the bullet of the mission, with alcoho1.,,'6 By 
August 1904 the German military had forced the 
majority of the Herero fighting forces into a decisive 
battle at the Waterberg in east-central SWA. The 
Herero had gathered the majority of their tribes, 
including cattle herds, women, and children, as was 
customary of their practice of war. At this defining 
moment when the war precipitated into genocide, the 
Herero were defeated in battle and forced to retreat 
34 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 10. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 30. 
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into the arid and unlivable Omaheke desert. Several 
hundred died in battle, and large portions of their 
cattle herds were slaughtered. Several thousand, 
including their leader Samuel Maherero, escaped 
through the desert into British-controlled 
Bechuanaland. The majority of the Herero, however, 
were not so lucky. Thousands perished of dehydration 
and starvation. On 2 October, several weeks after the 
battle, von Trotha issued an extermination order for 
the Herero people. Hendrik Witbooi, the chief of the 
Nama, perceived that the German military administra-
tion would come after the Nama once they had finished 
their slaughter of the Herero.37 He led his southern 
tribes to stand alongside the Herero in revolt shortly 
after the extermination order was issued in October 
1904.'8 
The dust had finally settled by 1908. All told, 
60,000 of the original 80,000 Herero and 10,000 ofthe 
original 20,000 Nama had been killed.39 The Herero 
and Nama societies "were now deprived of land and 
cattle and were without leaders;" their traditional way 
of life was irretrievably lost.40 The escalation from war 
to genocide is at least partly explained by the metro-
politan and military decision to treat the insurgent 
tribes with an unyielding ferocity to defend the prestige 
of the military, "the premier institution of the 
Kaiserreich."41 The issuance of the extermination 
order, however, was undoubtedly connected to the 
37 Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 183. 
38 Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros, 137. 
" Dreschler, .I·et Us Die Fighting, 214. 
40 Gewald, "Colonisation, Genocide, and Resurgence," in 
Genocide in Gennan South-West Africa, 136. 
41 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 37. 
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demands of the settler community, which wished for a 
total and final resolution of the issues that had been 
facing the colonial effort. The specific conduct of the 
German military in the handling of the genocide and 
the outcomes of these policies did have a direct and 
instrumental effect in the resolution of the multitudi-
nous issues hindering the German colonial project. 
The commission of genocide led to an increase of 
metropolitan attention toward German SWA, facilitated 
the improvement of the economic situation, provided 
the labor and security to further develop infrastruc-
ture, alleviated demographic concerns, and extended 
military control and legal authority in the colony. 
Metropolitan commitment increased markedly as a 
direct result of the genocide in SWA, althou gh not 
necessarily as a reaffirmation of the colonizing mis-
sion. Certainly, the dispatch of large numbers of 
troops under von Trotha in June 1904 itself consti-
tutes a serious increase in metropolitan commitment . 
. The total German military presence in the colony by 
1907 had reached 20,000 men, a serious army with 
serious support from the General Staff in Berlin.42 
However, the conduct of the war in SWA and particu-
larly the emerging accounts of the horrendous treat-
ment of the Herero and Nama aroused serious political 
opposition. The German satirical newspaper 
Simplicissimus ran a special issue focused particularly 
on criticism of German policy and settler behavior in 
the colonies on 3 May 1904.43 Even in the Reichstag, 
an anticolonial coalition emerged in 1906 under the 
leadership of August Bebel successfully blocked a vote 
42 Bridgman, The Revolt o/the Herems , 112 . 
43 "Spezial-Nummer Kolonien," Simplicissirnus , 3 May 1904. 
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to approve further funds for the war in SW A, which by 
then totaled 585 million Reichsmark.44 In January 
1907, Kaiser Wilhelm II dissolved the Reichstag and 
called for an election; this "Hottentot election" of 1907 
is referred to as the only election in European history 
to serve entirely as a referendum on colonial issues, 
and resulted in the formation of a legislature decisively 
in favor of the continuation of German colonialism!S 
Whether supportive or critical of the conduct of the 
war and colonial policy in SWA, the severity of the 
genocide had seized the attention of nearly every 
political actor and voter in metropolitan Germany by 
1907. Politically, the commitment to the colony had 
been sealed in blood, and the new and very public 
focus was on determining the future course of German 
policy in SW A. 
The genocide of the Herero and Nama was also 
instrumental in that it led to a significant alleviation of 
the economic concerns facing the colony. Reflecting 
the fundamental focus on land inherent to settler 
colonialism, the colonial propagandist Paul Rohrbach 
noted that an incidental benefit of the war had been 
the clearing of lands already purchased by German 
companies, "a task that would have otherwise proven 
difficult."46 The genocide had succeeded in removing 
practically all the Herero people from their traditional 
lands, freeing them for settlement. This was paired 
with an offer made by the German government ofland 
44 Dominik J. Schaller, "From Conquest to Genocide: 
Colonial Rule in German Southwest Africa and German East 
Africa," in Empire, Colony, Genocide, 298. 
4 S Ulrich van clef Heyden, "The 'Hottentot elections' of 1907," 
in Genocide in German South-West Africa, 113 . 
46 Gewald, Herem Heroes, 143. 
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grants to soldiers who volunteered to fight in war, in 
order to fill the newly emptied land.'7 After the geno-
cide, the import of cattle into the colony from Argen-
tina began as a response to massive livestock losses 
during the war, particularly at the battle of the 
Waterberg, and the preceding rinderpest epidemic. A 
settler woman wrote in her diary in 1909 about a 
transaction between her brother-in-law and a cattle 
trader named Herr Lu.: "He used to be a cowboy on a 
big farm in Argentina ... He came to our colony and 
survived the uprising of the Herero and its end. 
Because he had good connections in Argentina, he got 
a job from the government to buy up cattle for the 
farmers here."'8 This evidences that the settler cattle 
export economy had become economically viable after 
the genocide, and indicates an improvement of the 
German economic circumstances of the colony gener-
ally. Dreschler describes the years between 1908 and 
1914 as a "profit bonanza" for German investment, 
with the German South West Africa Company paying 
its shareholders a dividend of 64 per cent in 1909.'9 
Incidentally and without relation to the genocide 
specifically, diamonds had also been discovered by 
prospectors. 
An attempt to resolve earlier difficulties in securing 
indigenous labor was directly tied to the processes of 
genocide. Those Herero and Nama who surrendered or 
were taken as prisoner in battle, including women and 
children, were brought to concentration camps 
47 Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros, 112 . 
18 Antonia Thiede, Kleine Missis Toni: Mddchen und 
Frauenjahre im Sonnenland Deutsch-Siidwest, dem heutigen 
Namibia (Winhoek, Namibia: Benguela, 2004), 112. 
49 Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 244. 
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throughout the colony and subjected to forced labor. 
The largest and most notorious of these camps was on 
Shark Island, in the harbor of the German port of 
Luderitzbucht. 50 Throughout the colony, some 17,018 
prisoners had been taken into concentration camps by 
July 1906.51 These prisoners were functionally en-
slaved and served as a source of labor for infrastruc-
ture projects in the port towns and on the railways. 
Between December 1905 and November 1906, around 
900 Herero and Nama prisoners were employed in the 
construction of a new rail line between Luderitzbucht 
and the interior. 52 Elsewhere, the prisoners were forced 
into labor on farms, tasked with laying the groundwork 
for more permanent German settlement.53 These 
concentration camps served insidiously dual purposes: 
not only did they allow German businesses to circum-
vent earlier troubles with indigenous labor, but the 
poor conditions in the camps and the brutal overwork-
ing of the prisoners extended genocidal tactics and 
results beyond the battlefield. A British official reports 
that "many again died at the hands of the overseer and 
by the lash. Probably 60 per cent of the natives who 
surrendered [after the lifting of the extermination 
order] died this way.,,5. In the concentration camps, 
50 Casper Erichsen, «The angel of death has descended 
violently among them": concentration camps and prisoners-oJ-war 
in Nambia, 1904·08 (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 20051, 22. 
51 Erichsen, "Forced Labour in the Concentration Camp on 
Shark Island," in Genocide in German South-West Africa, 85. 
" Silvester and Gewald, Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue 
Book, 171. 
53 Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 232. 
S4 Silvester and Gewald. Annotated Reprint a/the 1918 Blue 
Book, 171. 
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the very strategies and methods of genocide were 
instrumental to the growth of colonialism in German 
SWA. German infrastructure was literally built on the 
back of forced African labor. 
The genocide also gave the opportunity for a 
complete overhaul of the legal and political relation-
ship Germans and indigenous Africans, as well as for 
the restructuring and expansion of administrative 
authority in the colony. While the laws had been 
extremely prejudiced against Africans before, the 
genocide all the more firmly convinced German set-
tlers , judges, and metropolitan lawmakers that harsh 
legal treatment of the indigenous popUlation was 
necessary. Theodor Leutwein had been removed as 
governor in 1905, and was replaced by Friedrich von 
Lindequist, who was more agreeable to the Kaiser 
because of his willingness to take whatever steps 
necessary to secure German interests in the colony.55 
On 18 August 1907, he issued a set of directives that 
relegated the surviving Herero and Nama in German 
SWA to a position of de facto subhumanity.56 Known as 
Ordinance No. 82, these directives introduced three 
especially unjust precedents: most indigenous groups 
were barred from owning land and cattle without the 
specific approval of the governor; all natives were 
subject to punishment as vagrants unless they carried 
identification passes demonstrating that they had 
work under a European employer; and it provided that 
servants could be severely punished by their masters 
for even the slightest offenses without the need for a 
5 5 John J. Grotpeter, Historical Dictionary of Namibia 
(Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1994),606. 
'" Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 231. 
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trial.57 Fears of miscegenation also led to the passage 
of a law in the Reichstag specifically prohibiting 
intermarriage between Germans and f,>.fricans. 58 These 
new laws were certainly the harshest of those imposed 
after the genocide, but even where the legal code was 
not explicitly remade to disadvantage indigenous 
Africans it was noted that "it is characteristic of all 
these German laws that their elasticity seems unlim-
ited, and that their application and practical exercise 
seems to have depended more on local senthent [sic] 
and personal and official prejudice than on the strict 
tenets of legal procedure and the administration of 
justice.,,59 We can be certain that the legal framework 
after the genocide was focused entirely on controlling 
and subduing the African population, and where 
Africans did find the opportunity to protect themselves 
it was always by escaping the law rather than working 
within it.60 The genocide was instrumental in directly 
providing the circumstance for this revision of the 
colonial legal code. 
The political relationship between the indigenous 
populations and the colonial administrative system 
also shifted as a result of the genocide. The earlier 
protection agreements were thrown out; the massacres 
of the Herero and Nama had eliminated the possibility 
of future uprisings, and rather than ruling through the 
57 Grotpeter, Historical Dictionary of Namibia, 381 . 
58 Smith, "The Talk of Genocide, the Rhetoric of 
Miscegenation," in The Imperialis t Imagination: Gennan 
Colonialism and Its Legacy, 117 . 
• 9 Silvester and Gewald, Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue 
Book, 191. 
60 Zimmerer, uThe Model Colony?," in Genocide in Gennan 
South-West A/rica, 28. 
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indirect powers of tribal chiefs the Germans dissolved 
every independent political organization of the indige-
nous people and handled administration directly.61 
Following the genocide, the relationship between the 
German authorities and indigenous Africans ceased to 
be political as such, and was handled rather through 
administrative and bureaucratic channels. The quash-
ing of African political autonomy was accompanied by 
a dramatic increase in the size and effective authority 
of the colonial administration. The most noteworthy 
development was the German declaration of the Polizei-
zone throughout the southern two-thirds of the 
colony.62 This was a region where the Germans felt 
assured in declaring the unconditional authority ofthe 
colonial administration, law, and police forces. The 
region north of the so-called "Red Line" remained 
under the control of indigenous chiefs, and European 
trade and travel beyond the Police Zone was prohib-
ited.63 Appropriately, considering the name of this new 
German administrative division, the police force 
'throughout the colony was greatly expanded, and by 
1909 a total of2,431 policemen were stationed in 69 
stations throughout the colony.64 Moreover, the 
administrative bureaucracy was expanded between 
1903 and 1914, from 6 districts to 16.65 The new 
metropolitan commitment to the colony as well as the 
real possibility of establishing effective control in the 
absence of militant Herero and Nama facilitated the 
" Ibid., 27. 
" Grotpeter, Historical Dictionary oJ Namibia, 412 . 
63 Ibid. 
64 Zimmerer, "The Model Colony?," in Genocide in German 
South-West Africa, 30 . 
65 Ibid., 26. 
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expansion of German authority and administration in 
SW A, a trend permitted by the genocidal consequences 
of the 1904-1908 war. 
Perhaps most fundamentally, the genocide had the 
effect of allaying the demographic concerns German 
settlers had held before 1904. No longer were German 
settlers a small minority among a large African popula-
tion in central SWA. On the one hand, the total white 
population tripled from 4,640 at the beginning of the 
genocide to 14,840 by 1913.66 This resulted from the 
expanded economic opportunities available in the 
colony after 1908, as well as the previously mentioned 
provision that military volunteers from Germany could 
receive grants of land. On the other hand, the very 
nature of the genocide provided that only a very small 
number of indigenous Herero and Nama people re-
mained in the central and southern lands most attrac-
tive for settlement. Genocide carries demographic 
consequences, and the mass murders in SWA were 
instrumental in ' creating a new sense of security and 
racial superiority for German settlers in the colony. 
There are few people remaining in our contempo-
rary world who consider genocide anything other than 
an absolute evil to be prevented at all costs. However, 
the passions behind this conviction have contributed 
to an incomplete ar:d uneven treatment of particular 
genocides within their historical context. The pro-
cesses of colonialism and genocide in German SW A 
must be imbricated. Although genocide pursued as a 
utopian solution to the problems facing the German 
colony did not resolve every weakness of the colonial 
" Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 244 . 
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mission,67 the fact that the commission of genocide 
fundamentally strengthened and altered the character 
of German colonial authority in SWA cannot be ig-
nored. The wholesale massacre of the Herero and 
Nama in what is today known as Namibia should 
certainly be remembered for its violence and human 
devastation, acknowledging the suffering of groups 
from the past to prevent such atrocities from being 
committed against others in the future, but also 
remembered not only for that: it also serves as a 
reminder that the horrors of genocide are not isolable 
from the historical circumstances under which they 
occur. The genocide of the Herero and Nama occurred 
within the structure and logic of German imperialism 
and wa:s instrumental to the goals and aspirations of 
the colonial project in Southwest Africa. Reexamining 
the genocide beyond the traditional boundaries of 
comparative genocide studies yields more specific and 
valuable insights such as these, and I suggest that 
. historians of all genocides and mass murders eschew 
the existing comparative models in favor of more 
contextualized analyses. 
Justin Hannigan is a senior History student at 
Santa Clara University, focusing primarily on issues in 
European colonial history. 
67 Jurgen Zimmerer, for example, argues too strongly that 
the genocide failed to solve many issues in "The Model Colony? ,n 
in Genocide in Gennan South-West Africa, giving little attention 
to the marked increase in the strength and authority of the 
German administration as compared to before the genocide. 
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